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voluntary and prompted by a recognition of the unforeseen hardship involved in the performance of the original contract.1 '
Where the facts of a case are such that the court feels that the
parties have in good faith adjusted their differences, it is very
likely to make use of the argument that the new agreement is
valid for the reason that there had been a rescission of the former contract. 12 It is believed that in most cases of this kind there
is lacking a solid factual basis for finding mutual cancellation
and that to rest a decision upon a rescission is to rest it upon a
fiction. Louisiana courts could, by applying Article 1901 of the
Code, which specifically provides that obligations must be performed in good faith, refuse to give validity to a promise of
additional compensation except in cases where the plaintiff's
conduct is not morally blameworthy and where the new promise
was given because of some unforeseen hardship.
The language of the instant case is, however, in line with
past decisions regarding the performance of pre-existing legal
duties. The opinion of the court indicates that if necessary it
would not have hesitated to resort to the use of the common law
concept of consideration in rendering the judgment. As the jurisprudence stands at present, a pre-existing obligation will be held
enforceable if the promise can be supported as a "compromise
of differences and not a gratuitous undertaking." If the facts of
the case will not lend themselves to a compromise situation, the
obligation will be held invalid for lack of common law consideration.
Geraldine E. Bullock
LEGISLATION-CONSTRUCTION

OF STATUTES

In State v. St. Julian' the Supreme Court dealt with the
question as to which of two acts passed at the same session of
the Legislature purporting to amend the same section of the
Revised Statutes should be given effect. This problem is one
which the Supreme Court will be called upon to decide again in
the near future, because there are several other instances in
11. Linz v. Schuck, 106 Md. 220, 67 Atl. 286 (1907); Munroe v. Perkins, 26
Mass. 298, 20 Am. Dec. 475 (1930); Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc., 231
N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).

12. Martiniello v. Bamel, 255 Mass. 25, 150 N.E. 838 (1926); Munroe v.
Perkins, 26 Mass. 298, 20 Am. Dec. 475 (1830);
Basch, Inc., 231 N.Y. 196, 131 N.E. 887 (1921).
1. 221 La. 1018, 61 So. 2d 464 (1952).

Schwartzreich v. Bauman-
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NOTES

which the Legislature of 1952 enacted seemingly conflicting stat2
utes amending other provisions of the Revised Statutes.
Act 303 of 1952 purported to amend Sections 179 and 180 of
Title 15 of the Revised Statutes so as to permit the clerk to
employ the services of a deputy clerk or stenographer in the
preparation of these lists and further to provide that such lists
may be typewritten. The act did not change the number of persons to be named in the general venire and grand jury lists.
Act 158, on the other hand, purported to amend Sections 179
and 180 of Title 15 of the Revised Statutes so as to provide for
the selection of not more than six hundred persons for the general
venire and for the selection of from fifty to seventy-five grand
jurors. This act also amended Sections 181 and 182 so as to provide for the selection of not more than one hundred names to
8
serve as petit jurors for each week.
While admitting its duty to harmonize and reconcile two
acts where possible, the court held that Act 158 was in conflict
with Act 303. In reaching this decision, the court applied the
arbitrary rule borrowed from the common law that the last act
in point of time should prevail 4 and held that consequently Act
158 had been impliedly repealed by Act 303.
The fact that such a rule has never before been applied by a
Louisiana court to two acts passed at the same session of the
Legislature raises a doubt as to the justification of its application
in the instant case. Prior Louisiana courts have always reconciled
acts passed during the same session of the Legislature. The
reasoning behind reconciliation was based on a cognizance of
judicial duty to harmonize law when possible and to carry out
the intent of the Legislature. 5 There is a strong presumption
against implied repeal, especially in such a case as the present,
2. La. Acts 389 and 272 of 1952, amending La. R.S. 1950, 3:453; La. Acts
272 and 425 of 1952, amending La. R.S. 1950, 3:2091; La. Acts 17, 211, and 383
of 1952, amending La. R.S. 1950, 13:692; La. Acts 269 and 542 of 1952, amending La. R.S. 1950, 18:6; La. Acts 127 and 264 of 1952, amending La. R.S. 1950,
42:261; La. Acts 326 and 364 of 1952, amending La. R.S. 1950, 42:571.
3. Prior to the purported amendments of 1952, the Revised Statutes
15:179-181 provided for the selection of three hundred persons for the general
venire, for the selection of twenty grand jurors, and for the selection of

thirty petit jurors for each week.
4. La. Act 158 of 1952 was passed on June 23, 1952, and approved by the
Governor on June 29. La. Act 303 of 1952 was passed on July 2, 1952, and
approved on July 9.
5. Chappuis v. Reggie, 62 So. 2d 92 (La. 1952); New Orleans v. Board of
Supervisors of Elections for Parish of Orleans, 216 La. 116, 43 So. 2d 237
(1949); State v. Shushan, 206 La. 415, 19 So. 2d 185 (1944).
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"since it is not presumed that the same body of men would pass
'6
conflicting and incongruous acts."
Perhaps the most important consideration in dealing with
questions of statutory construction is the legislative intent,7 and
it is particularly necessary in the instant case. Act 158 of 1952
was enacted for the purpose of fixing a minimum and a maximum
number for both the preparation of the lists and for the drawing
of grand juror names. The provisions of Act 303 on this subject
are identical with those found in Sections 179 and 180 prior to
the 1952 legislation. It is submitted that the only changes which
were intended by Act 303 were to permit the clerk to employ the
services of a deputy clerk or stenographer in the preparation of
the lists and to provide that all names, lists, et cetera, might be
typewritten. In view of these purposes or intendments of the
Legislature in enacting these two acts, it is submitted that they
are entirely different in scope and do not conflict.8
6. City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for Parish of
Orleans, 216 La. 116, 144, 43 So. 2d 237, 247 (1949).
7. Art. 18, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The universal and most effectual way
of discovering the true meaning of a law, when its expressions are dubious,
is by considering the reason and spirit of it, or the cause which induced the
Legislature to enact it."
State v. Crescent Cigar and Tobacco Co., 7 La. App. 659 (1928); Galloway
v. Wyatt Metal and Boiler Works, 189 La. 837, 181 So. 187 (1938).
8. In the opinion of the writer, effect could be given to both acts without
conflict, and they could be combined as indicated in the following (the text
in capital letters constitutes the amendment effected by Act 158 of 1952, and
the text in italics constitutes the amendment effected by Act 303 of 1952):
Section 179. "At the time ordered by the district judge, the jury commission shall meet at the office of the clerk of the district court and, in the presence of two or more witnesses, shall select from the persons qualified to
serve as jurors for their respective parishes, three hundred persons, OR SUCH
NUMBER

OF PERSONS

NOT TO EXCEED

SIX HUNDRED

AS

THE DISTRICT

JUDGE

MAY

DIRECT, a list of whom shall be made under the supervision of the commission, and said witnesses. In the preparation of this list, the slips for use
in the general venire box, the proces verbal of the meeting, and in all proceedings of the jury commission, the clerk of court and said commission, may
avail Itself of the services of a deputy clerk, or of a stenographer, and all
names, lists, slips, etc., may be typewritten. This list shall be the general
venire list and shall be kept complete and supplemented from time to time
as hereinafter enacted. Each of the names on said list shall be written on
a separate slip of paper, together with the number of the word or place of
residence of such persons, and the slips of paper containing the names
selected, except those containing the names of the persons chosen to serve
as grand jurors as hereinafter provided, shall be placed in a box which shall
be labelled: 'General Venire Box.'"
Section 180. "Immediately after completing the general venire list, the
commission shall select therefrom the names of NOT LESS THAN FIFTY CITIZENS
AND NOT MORE THAN SEVENTY-FIVE, possessing the qualifications of grand jurors,
to be taken from different portions of the parish as far as practicable, who
shall be subject to duty as grand jurors during the term of six months after
the grand jury is empaneled and until a succeeding grand jury shall have
been impaneled.
"The names of the persons so selected shall be written or typewritten on
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Even if the statutes had been in conflict in the instant case,
it is believed that the court's ruling would be hard to justify.
While it is true that a majority of the states resort to the rule
that the last expression of legislative will prevails when two
statutes passed at the same session of the Legislature are in
irreconcilable conflict, there are strong reasons which negative
its application to Louisiana legislation. The first and most logical
argument is that Louisiana legislation passed at the same session
becomes law at the same time: "at twelve o'clock noon, on the
twentieth day after the Legislature shall have adjourned."9 In
most other states, statutes become the law when signed by the
Governor of the state, 10 thus making it possible for two legislative
acts passed during the same session to become law on different
dates. Aside from the above fact, even in other states, the Governor does not necessarily sign the acts in the order in which
they are passed, nor does the Secretary of State necessarily
number them according to the time of their passage. The bills
are signed by the Governor and numbered by the Secretary of
State at random. In many cases a later act is signed first because
it was the last to be placed on the stack of statutes awaiting the
Governor's signature.
Another argument against the practicality of applying the
rule that the last act prevails when two acts on the same subject
are passed at the same session of the Legislature is that the last
act may be one which was hastily proposed by an anxious legislator wishing only to establish some evidence of his participation
in the session, while the earlier act may be one proposed for a
broad purpose or one intended to fulfill some important need of
the state. Observation and investigation have disclosed that in
many cases the bills sponsored by the administration, the Louisiana Law Institute, and those drawn up by conscientious or
experienced legislators are passed at an earlier date. It is
believed that such an act should not be arbitrarily set aside
merely because of an unintended conflict with a less important
bill passed at a later time. The situation, it is submitted, should
be solved by investigation deeper than the mere reckoning of
the date that the act was signed by the Governor.
Legislative intent should be sought in the language, history,
slips of paper in the presence of the commissioners and they shall place the
slips in an envelope, seal the same and endorse thereon the words 'List of

Grand Jurors.'"
9. La. Const. of 1921, Art. III, § 27.
10. 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, § 588.
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and purpose of each statute. But if there is a direct conflict
between two acts which are to take effect simultaneously, then
it would seem that the court should declare both acts inoperative
and void, unless some reason may be found to show that the
Legislature intended one to prevail over the other.
Helen Marie Wimmer
MINERAL RIGHTs-AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE DOCTRINE--REVERSIONARY INTEREST

In Long-Bell Lumber Company v. Granger, 63 So. 2d 420
(La. 1953), the Louisiana Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Hamiter, held that the sale of a second mineral servitude to
the owner of an existing mineral servitude on the same tract of
land was void since one may not validly purchase that which he
already owns.
This case involves a very complicated factual situation relating to a number of conveyances among various entities of the
Long-Bell interests, "the good faith separate existence of which
[was] .. .not challenged by the defendants." 1 A brief statement
of the material facts are as follows:
In 1931 the Long-Bell Lumber Sales Corporation conveyed to the Long-Bell Minerals Corporation a mineral servitude on the lands in dispute. In 1936 the Long-Bell Farm
Land Corporation, a sub-vendee of the Long-Bell Lumber
Sales Corporation, purported to convey a mineral servitude
on the same tract of land to the Long-Bell Petroleum Company, which had previously merged with the Long-Bell Minerals Corporation. In 1943 Long-Bell Farm Land Corporation sold the land to the defendants' authors in title and
reserved the mineral rights to the Long-Bell Petroleum Corporation. The defendants, Miller and Granger, acquired the
lands by separate transactions in 1944 and 1946.
The plaintiffs brought these consolidated petitory actions
against the defendants after receiving adverse decisions in
previous jactitation suits.
The defendants' claim to the mineral interests in question
depended upon the effect of the 1936 deed. They contended that
1. Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Granger, 63 So. 2d 420 (La. 1953).

